1.2.1. Mechanics of Existence and Rationales of Reality PDF Print E-mail
 
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1.2.1. Mechanics of Existence and Rationales of Reality
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In other words, this research can be classified as epistemological idealism in contrast to 'empiricist naturalism' (Mc Dowell (1998), as quoted in (Fink, 2006)) or 'naturalism of disenchanted nature'. The latter sort of naturalism takes it for granted that reality is 'exhausted by the natural world, in the sense of the world as the natural sciences are capable of revealing it to us' (ibid p. 173). The epistemological idealist position advanced in this research on the other hand holds that all knowledge is first a creation of the mind and then, following Dewey’s pragmatist understanding, becomes a proposition with "warranted assertibility" by reaching inter-subjective agreement about the meaning and usage of the concept. To illustrate this position with an example given by Staloff (2000): We all agree that directions given in north, south, east and west are practical conceptualizations; nature however does not come pre-parsed in these categories, rather we have created and agreed upon these operators, and because they have proven useful we inter-subjectively accept them as knowledge. Applied to the conceptualization of reality and existence developed above this means that, we first create our individual reality which we can share through communication to create inter-subjective collective realities. At the same time these realities are constantly undergoing empirical tests and the feedback from these tests serves as description of what really exists.





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