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As explained in the theoretic background, cybernetics (especially in its conceptualisation of system design and system optimization based on feedback information) and the modality to describe the strange attractors (as interacting phenomena positively or negatively influencing the functioning of a system regarding a particular outcome) taken from the complexity sciences, are deployed to describe the insights of this research. The following paragraphs develop some concepts found influential in setting the investigatory scene.
4.2.2.1. Entrepreneurial and Second Order Cybernetics
Birnbaum (1988; 2004), who describes the functioning of higher education institutions from a cybernetic perspective, proposes the following cybernetic loop, which serves as a point of departure for the model developed in this study: There is a change in the internal or external environment of the HEI which somehow triggers the organization to respond. Subsequently, one or several important variables change, and this change is perceived by a sensing unit. The sensing unit reports to the controlling unit and the latter causes again an organizational response. This cycle is continued until the feedback value is acceptable (Birnbaum, 1988, p.192). Of course this works in both directions; what the system asks from the individual and what the individual expects from the system.
In this approach the leadership structure would be best explained by working through what Mintzberger described as management by exception. Time is spent on responding to disturbances. This seems to be an adequate management style in stable or only gradually changing times. Another important role of cybernetic leadership is designing the system, or more precisely, designing the feedback variables that allow to measure the state of the system. This latter activity can be understood as entrepreneurial cybernetics as it is directed towards the future, as such it is engaged in pre-sensing (Scharmer, 2002) or planning future states.
As a senior manager at UOC expressed, creating and maintaining productive technology environments is like cooking (UOC 7), one needs the right ingredients, in the right amount and quality, as well as the right timing and the competence to prepare them adequately. It is the combination of an entrepreneurial  mindset and the physical infrastructure and resources that unleashes the positive strivings of entrepreneurial practice. As the individual responsible for the FU’s entrepreneurship program put it, entrepreneurship can cause meaning, (FU 7) but it needs a supportive practice environment or milieu to enact it. Edgar Schein (1993, p.15) expressed this sentiment with his understanding that leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin. There is no mindset disconnection from infrastructure, but it is epistemologically rewarding to analyse them separately. What Wittgenstein called “Begriffswelt” (Wittgenstein, 1969), the meta-physical understanding formulated in words and what Heidegger named “Gestell” (Heidegger, 1994) – the procedural (technological) infrastructure of things.
“Observing the observers” (Beyes, 2005; Luhmann, 1992) is the title of a paper analysing the ‘optimisation’ of reported results based on the understanding of the actors, in regards to what feedback is expected and not based on actual changes in the practices. Bureaucracies, with their rigid reporting framework, are assessed to be particularly susceptible to this effect. As the stakeholders of the university will always perceive and change their behaviour relative to what the system proposes, one ends up in a system of eternal complexity as the feedback loops will never end. This phenomenon has been entitled hyper-complexity or the problem of the second-order-observer (ibid). The result of this phenomenon is that actors change their positions taking expected behaviour into consideration. For example data and reports can be cooked up until they look the way the controlling/observing institution expect or demands them to be.
Cross Case Analysis
The second-order observation phenomenon is a dominant shaper of the official face of institutions, flourishing on in-transparency. Let’s look at some examples from the case studies:
In the case of the FU, for example, the leadership is said to have put a befriended consultancy in charge of evaluating and advising on the structure of the IT landscape, which subsequently produced a report favourable to what the management’s intentions were beforehand (FU management 2).
Even more striking is the case of the FU’s radical improvement of 46 positions in a university ranking about institutional support for business creation, without substantive changes in the practices or infrastructure (Trosien, 2005). The only variable was that the person completing the survey had a more adequate knowledge base regarding the expectations of the ranking’s authors.
The UPC has, as was described in the case, an indicator culture (UPC administration 1). The same conclusions had been assessed by an expert commission: “The ‘point system’ introduced by UPC leaders to account for the research contribution of staff has led to the quantitative assessment of time allocation in other fields – teaching, administration, services, etc […] thus making the exercise so complicated” (EUA, 2005). Naturally, this is a fertile ground for a double life, with one formal and official face (UPC administration 2) while on the other hand, the bureaucratic practices are passed by and actors default to what they individually perceive to be the best practice, because there is no culture to control the practice but the final indicator itself (UPC faculty 3).
At the UOC, a similar case was reported regarding the selection of new research lines. While the official version speaks of a neutral assessment process benchmarking other universities etc. (UOC management 4) others sources report that it was a decision based solely on the expertise and authority of individual leadership.
Paralysis Through Change
However, another problem arises when the stakeholders do not know what is expected from them. Many non-entrepreneurial entities will reach a state of paralysis when they do not know what is expected, but believe that some new expectation is about to manifest:
This phenomenon could be observed in the case after the UOC board had appointed the new rector. All stakeholders were expecting change and (next to the natural reassignment of positions) some immediate effects, like an improvement of how the administrative managers were treating the academics (UOC faculty 14). Nevertheless, the institution remained in an alert state, everybody ready to adopt and comply to new leads and demands, even though there were only general indications as to what ‘new changes’ were expected; eventually, all actors defaulted to a ‘let’s not change anything now’ mantra – adding the silent addendum ‘as we don’t know how the new leadership will influence this’ - some months later.
The FU also has a long tradition of ennobling an indicator culture, only recently has the leadership begun to demand that individual administrative stakeholders design their own goals. This is a radically new practice because sub-divisions are used to “kicking themselves free” (frei strampeln) from bureaucratic guidelines, as a result, the management expects them to engage in dynamic negotiations about their planning. The leadership commented that “the system is in the process of learning this in the moment” (FU Chancellor 3), it became clear that, while some departments are entering naturally into the new practices, others are paralysed by the new responsibility that comes with the flexibility.
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